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There is no doubt that what is called Islamic fundamen-
talism is one among many facets of the Islamic world
which in itself represents a public phenomenon with
many divergences. Just like colonialism and folk reli-
gion, this religious fundamentalism does not represent
a monolithic system of cultural expression. Rather it is
an outcome of colonial encroachment, as well as a nega-
tion or rejection of both folk-religious tradition and
colonialism. This recent Muslim self-concept goes back
to the evolution of an Islamic ideology that was only
developed in the 1930s and arose out of the need to dis-
tance and distinguish its adherents from the politically
dominant colonial sector as well as from the handed-
down Muslim tradition. This new Muslim identity
expresses the relationship of tension between what
may be called colonial and indigenous life worlds. It is
part of the multi-layered social relationships within
modern Muslim society. I will try to explain the genesis
and dynamics of this fundamentalist identity. 
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The incremental social complexity is, among
other things connected to the establishment
of the colonial sector that emerged parallel to
the traditional sector in the 19th century: Colo-
nial and indigenous sectors are, ideally speak-
ing, socially coherent, being informed by what
can be called an Ôinternal arrangementÕ. How-
ever, in between these two extreme Ð coherent
Ð poles, areas of transition have emerged: Peo-
ple caught between the boundaries of the dif-
ferent milieus and social groups on the borders
between traditional and colonial societies. It is
important to note that these groups comprise
far less definite, closed, social strata than seg-
ments of different strata or classes that over-
lap. They are chiefly to be found in the lowest
to middle levels of the colonial hierarchy as
well as in the intelligentsia. They oscillate
between fixed positions and are ambivalent in
their constitution Ð hybrids so to speak. While
they work for the colonial or postcolonial
economy, their area of reproduction is to be
found in the traditional realm. In other words,
social forces exist here, which are based on
structural differences that manifest them-
selves, for example, in traditional and modern
economic and social sectors and thus consti-
tute completely different levels of identity that
are not socially coherent. Rapid social change
puts into question what has so far been obvi-
ous, leading to intense problems of identifica-
tion and to reorientation. Having broken away
from social ties, these identities are increasing-
ly dependent on a network of social relations:
It appears that the ordinary citizen, who is firm-
ly bound by organization, profession and rela-
tions, is as little dependent on networks as
members of simple societies. If one follows the
postcolonial discourse, the hybrid view of the
traveller-between-two-worlds, in-between
two border conditions, basically allows a per-
spective on historical and contemporary reali-
ty and a re-definition of the world, not so much
from the viewpoint of some authority outside
but as the result of an inner consciousness. A
double vision arises which lays the ground for
a creative indigenous discourse that can
enable a new construction of identity, towards
one that asserts: ÔI want to be different.Õ This
desire for difference leads to a transformation
of identity, a rebirth. The conflict which arises
between a modern technological work con-
text, such as the assembly line, and a tradition-
al life-style, like the b i r a d a r i system, can be
negotiated in at least three different ways:
1. Integrationism, i.e., adapting or modernizing
oneÕs tradition which continues to be articu-
lated in Islamic symbols and terms;
2. Isolationism, i.e., enriching or even replacing
the world of modern production with tradi-
tion; or
3. the creation of a substitute culture Ð which
provides at least a temporary refuge from
the sharp contrast between modern and tra-
ditional, such as urban crime, consumption
of narcotics, or the world of cinema. The ven-
eration cult may also be considered here. 
Each of these possible negotiations depends
on the respective social position of the individ-
ual and the social prestige he relates it with. In
short, the higher a person stands in the colo-
nial and postcolonial hierarchy, the greater is
the tendency towards modernization in which
Islam serves as a frame of reference. Also, the
higher the degree of social disintegration and
the fewer the chances of upward social mobili-
ty, the greater is the inclination towards tradi-
tionalization and, in the medium term, even
willingness for radicalism, hence isolationism. 
The integrationist way is followed by leading
Islamists like Abul Ala Maududi and other func-
tionaries of Islamist organizations. They largely
originate from this field of tension between
identity and alienation, traditional and modern
sectors. They are generally representative of
middle range professionals bound up in the
postcolonial system, and relatively highly
placed in society. They live largely in a tradi-
tional world, but due to their integration into
the dominant postcolonial system, they adopt
and adapt main terms and ideas central to this
system and recognize them as part of their
own biography. Islamic terms such as d a s t u r
and s h u r a are extricated from their religious
context and given such new ideological values
such as parliament and constitution, without,
however, renouncing their Islamic identity.
Party system and nation-state, for instance, are
interpreted as having always been Islamic.
With this normative replacement, these Islamic
classicists can transcend traditional bound-
aries, legitimize modern developments within
the Islamic semiotics and stabilize their own
societal position. In this process of ideologiza-
tion of Islam and re-invention of tradition,
code or identity switching is most important.
This switching, that is the reciprocal translation
of symbols and terms, provides the ability of
action on different societal levels. To the out-
sider Ð for example, to the colonial public Ð the
Islamist argues ideologically, limiting the use
of Islamic symbols to the indispensable. To the
insider Ð that is the traditional society Ð he/she
pursues the theological argument. The Islamic
cult is reinforced. The theological discussion,
however, is of debatable theological value. It is
this network behaviour that is responsible for
the particular dynamics of political Islam.
Islamists usually promise a righteous society
here and now through catharsis: a transforma-
tion from corruption to purity, from Jahiliya
(pre-Muhammadan times, conditions of igno-
rance) to Islam. This Jahiliya was, according to
Islamists, a result of the modernization policies
of the State. The deviation from the right path
and the neglecting of religious duties have
resulted in the loss of religious and cultural
identity. Hence, the Islamist concept of history
is informed by the notion of constant decay.
They call for the reconstruction of an idealized
pure and pre-colonial cultural context Ð imita-
tio muhammadi. This radical re-invention of
tradition seems to be grounded in a heritage
under which the handed-down canon was
blurred and lost, as in the obliteration and
appropriation process of colonial power in the
18th and 19th centuries. Therefore, the only
way to legitimate the necessary rebirth and
revival is to go back beyond this obliterated
tradition. Consequently, a new normative and
formative past is created. These Islamists can
thus distinguish themselves from other Mus-
lims and from secular politicians. They are the
avant gardes or the hegemonic identity which
considers itself authorized to establish renewal
Ð t a j d i d.
Aspects of their critique are systematized in
the context of a history of salvation and formu-
lated as an integristic programme that, howev-
er, has a clear integrationist character. In con-
trast to their slogan, islamiser la modernit,
their own Islamic tradition is modernized,
since the imagined Islamic society is to com-
pete and correspond with Western achieve-
ments. This would only be possible in a central-
ized Islamic state over which they would wield
control as the agents of GodÕs sovereignty on
earth, as with the Hizb Ullah (Party of God) or
the JamaÔat-e Islami (Islamic Society). The
Qu'ran and Sunna would be the ideal basis for
a universal, legally ethical monism. Up to this
point of Islamist discourse, ideas such as plu-
ralism, democracy and human rights have little
value in an imagined Islamic territory, since the
main concern is to establish a unique Islamic
identity. On the other hand, these kinds of pan-
Islamic ideas are always postulated within the
boundaries of a nation state, with political
Islam providing the imagination of the realiza-
tion and reconstruction of a society within a
nation-state. As is evident, fundamentalism
preaches a traditionalism of solidarity, which is
primarily oriented to life in the world and has
certain ideas of reform. In closer view however,
its postulates reveal mere prophecies, advice,
threats and general desiderata with a little
consistent programme. It fails to solve factual
problems, offering mostly regressive attempts
at solutions precisely because its orientation is
mythical, hence restorative, and hardly utopi-
an, that is social revolutionary. However, since
the 1980s one can witness a clear change in
the Islamist discourse. This is particularly true
in postmodern times, when political Islam has
failed, because Islamist promises were not real-
ized. Analogous to this failure, new alterna-
tives have emerged, reflecting the interaction
of different social realities and cultural identi-
ties in a pluralizing society in which Islamists
have also started increasingly using ideas of
mythical re-establishments to mark out their
social and political territories and to enlarge
them, albeit within the existing nation-state. In
this phase of post-Islamism their own position
is constantly re-negotiated vis--vis the gov-
ernment, external patrons, other Islamist
groups, and the masses or the target audi-
ences. This involves competition and contest
over interpretation of symbols and control of
institutions, because symbols are an integral
part of Muslim politics. They express the values
and are constitutive of a political community.
Hence, there is a constant struggle concerning
peopleÕs imagination and, following that,
about the objective chances and resources in a
free market. Therefore, Islamic Ð even funda-
mentalist Ð principles must constantly be rein-
terpreted. The result is a flexibility of ideas and
divergence over time and space. It is in the gap
between divine plan Ð s h a r i a Ð and human
understanding Ð politics Ð that the perennially
fertile space of critique can be found. This can
intensify competition and conflicts. The alter-
native to fundamentalism is that multiple cen-
tres of power and contenders for authority
come to certain accommodations. The recent
rather peaceful change of the weekly holiday
from Friday to Sunday in Pakistan can indeed
be an indication of negotiation to the relative
satisfaction of all. It is these different discours-
es that reflect the complicity of the Islamic
public. This is particularly true in the field of
the supposed latent and open tensions
between Muslim scholars, sufis and intellectu-
als. There seems to be enough societal and
economic overlappings and cross-connections
or personal unions between, for example,
JamaÔat-e Islami and Barelwis so that both
come to terms with one another, and given
boundaries and norms are shifted, displaced,
and extended. Thus, making sense of religious
fundamentalism can be possible only if these
complex and dynamic perspectives are contex-
tualized. I contend that studies on Modern
Islam therefore should be read in the light of
articulations of particular social and cultural
realities negotiating over boundaries between
spheres of social activity and institutions. For,
to approach Islamic culture normatively does
not contribute to its understanding. Islamicity
is merely the lingual and symbolic expression
of this negotiation. Fundamentalism is one of
the articulations through which Modern Islam
is to be understood. '
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